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This paper examines how policy affects social expenditures. Analyzing an OECD panel from 
1980 to 2003, five political variables are tested: Election- and pre-election years, the 
ideological party composition of the governments, the number of coalition partners and the 
fact, if the ruling government has a majority in parliament or not (minority government). I 
find that neither of these variables have an impact on social expenditures using different 
model set-ups. The influence of national governments seems to be limited by the 
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The analysis of social expenditures is a well known issue in empirical research. In times of 
the welfare state, social expenditures rise (see Figure 1). However, it is not that trivial why. 
Hence researchers still look for respective explanations. The current paper focuses on the 
impact policy might have on social expenditures. However, this question causes the general 
caveat how politicians are actually able to influence economic outcome. The latter might be 
determined by external factors, e. g. the globalisation. But exactly this induces an interesting 
empirical question, as the globalisation itself has potential impacts on social expenditures. 
Theoretically, it affects social expenditures by two counteracting effects. On the one hand, the 
internationalisation of the economy causes tax competition and thereby reduces the size of 
government and finally spending for social affairs (“efficiency effect”). On the other hand, the 
so called “compensation effect” increases social expenditures because the national 
governments try to protect their citizens against the risks of the globalization (e. g. Rodrik 
(1998)). Hence it is an empirical question in the current literature to test for the structural 
impacts of the internationalization of the economy. Kumpmann (2004) finds in an OECD 
panel from 1980 to 2001 that social expenditures decrease the higher the international trade of 
a respective country. However, foreign direct investment does not matter at all. Dreher (2004) 
analyses an unbalanced OECD panel from 1970 to 2000. He does not get any evidence that 
the globalization affects social expenditures. Vaubel (2005) finds that social expenditures 
increase the higher the import quota, but also that constraints to the capital movement are 
insignifcant in the period from 1984 to 1995. Results change in a cross-section analysis from 
1990 to 1997.  
Furthermore, the ideological party composition of the government is an explanatory variable 
of particular interest. While Vaubel (2005) finds that left governments increase social 
expenditures, Dreher (2004) cannot confirm this prospect. Iversen (2001) examines 
government transfers (including social security transfers) controlling for the impact of 
partisan politics in a panel of 15 OECD countries from 1961 to 1993. Regarding this kind of 
expenditure, he does not find that parties matter. Kittel and Obinger (2002) analyze social 
spending in a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1982 to 1997, review and discuss the existing 
literature and thereby provide an important paper in the current debate. Overall, they get weak 
evidence for the partisan approach. Potrafke (2006a) examines the allocation of public 
expenditures in a panel of 15 countries from 1990 to 2004. Thereby the impacts of the Discussion Papers  676 
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following five political determinants are tested: Election- and Pre-Election years, the 
(ideological) party composition of the governments, the number of coalition partners and the 
fact, if the ruling government has a majority in parliament or not (minority government). The 
expenditures are grouped by the so called COFOG classification and one of the categories 
describes spending for “social protection”. Interestingly, this category is not at all affected by 
the political variables.  
This paper analyses if policy causes the rise of social expenditures – controlling for the 
impacts of the globalization. In extension to prior research, I test for the impact of the five 
political variables first applied in Potrafke (2006a). The set of political variables is extended 
with respect to time and further single countries. Besides, the analysis refers to an updated 
OECD panel data set (SOCX) that provides continuous data of social expenditures for 20 
OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. Thereby the social expenditure data are produced in a 
unique fashion taking care of the heterogeneity between the single countries. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional background 
originating from the theory of political economics. Section 3 presents the data. In section 4 
the empirical model is set up, the political variables are described and suitable panel data 
methods are briefly discussed. Section 5 reports the estimation results and section 6 
concludes. 
2 Institutional  Background 
The issue of this paper is to test for the effects of election and pre-election years, the 
ideological party composition as well as the type of government on social expenditures. The 
impacts of these variables on economic policy stem from a huge and model based literature of 
political economics. In this paper, my emphasis is not to find evidence for a single theoretical 
model. Instead I will very briefly repeat the main ideas of respective (well known) theoretical 
work establishing a basis for the following empirical analysis. 
First, the political business cycle approaches and the partisan theory clarify how politicians 
try to influence economic outcome. One implication of the theories by Nordhaus (1975) and 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and others is that all the politicians will do the same policy. 
Ideology does not matter. Policies will converge. In addition, they imply a particular pattern 
between elections on the one hand and the impacts of economic policy on the other hand. 
Nordhaus (1975)’ opportunistic school asserts that politicians fool the public just to win Discussion Papers  676 
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elections. They will boost the economy right before elections. The rational political business 
cycle theory by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and others criticizes the modelling by adaptive 
expectations and introduced rational expectations instead. In this approach, information 
asymmetries play a role as a source of the electoral cycles. The political incumbent tries to 
exploit his information advantage by signalling his economic competence before the 
elections. Therefore, I will conclude from these approaches that Election and Pre-Election 
years will affect social expenditures so that the preferences of the median voter are fulfilled.1 I 
expect higher social expenditures before elections. 
In contrast, the partisan approach focuses on the strong impact of party ideology. As a result, 
platforms and policies will not converge. Instead, right and left politicians will provide 
different policies by concentrating on the preferences of their partisans. The left party appeals 
more to the labor base and promotes expansionary policies, whereas the right party appeals 
more to capital owners and is therefore more concerned with keeping inflation down. This 
holds for both sub-approaches of the partisan theory - for the classical one installed by Hibbs 
(1977) as for the rational one developed by Alesina (1987). Therefore my prospect is that the 
party composition of the governments affects social expenditures.2 I expect higher social 
expenditures under left than right governments.  
Another political determinant stems from the literature of fiscal policy. It arises from the 
“common pool problem” discussed e. g. by Weingast et al. (1981) and implies that decision 
costs increase with the number of decision makers. Hence the amount of social expenditures 
is expected to be higher the more parties form a government. As coalition partners also have 
to find agreements how much they will spend for social affairs, I expect that the type of 
government, namely the number of coalition partners as well as the fact if the ruling 
government has a majority in parliament (minority government) affect social expenditures. 
                                                 
1 Note that there is no explicit assignment between the two business cycle theories and the impact of election and 
pre-election years. Nordhaus (1975) does not necessarily imply that only election years matter as well as the one 
by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) is also somehow related to the impact of election years. 
2 This implies that there is divergence of policies and platforms. Theoretically, in a simple two party model, 
ideology must over compensate the vote maximizing effect in this case. In a multi party model, manifoldness and 
traditions of the parties are assumed to avert policy convergence. See e. g. Mueller (2003): Chapters 11-13 and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000): Chapters 3 and 5 for an overview of the respective fundamental literature on party 
competition. The current paper is not eligible to discuss the impact of ideology, what it means or where it comes 




Beyond this, I will not discuss other impacts and interactions3 any further. Kittel and Obinger 
(2002) review the literature with any pros and cons about national political influences on 
economic issues due to the globalisation etc. and take institutional impacts into account. 
Garrett (1998: Chapter 2) discusses in detail how domestic policy might work in the global 
economy. The aim of the current paper is that national policy might matter and to test for it.  
3 Data 
The data set contains yearly data for social expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) of 20 
OECD countries (see Figure 1). The countries included are Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switerland, United Kingdom and the 
USA for the period from 1980 to 2003. The panel is balanced in this constellation.4 I will use 
them as dependent variables of the econometric model presented in the following section. The 
data sets are provided by the OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX). However, there 
might be an important caveat against the examination of social expenditures across countries: 
The social benefits and above all their classification differ from country to country. But 
exactly this problem is tackled by the OECD. They include transfers with respect to nine 
different fields in “Total expenditures” and define it as follows: “Social expenditure is the 
provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and finanacial contributions 
targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances 
which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial 
contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an 
individual contract or transfer.” (OECD (2007)). Hence, one might be aware of this 
heterogeneity problem across the countries, but using the SOCX seems to be the best 
procedure analysing social expenditures in a cross-country study.  
                                                 
3 Interactions between the ideological party composition of the government and the number of coalition partners 
could be considered in more detail. But then, the judging of respective coalition types becomes much more 
complicated and further assumptions would have been made.  
4 Data for Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea and Poland are available from 1990. For Mexico 
there are data from 1985 to 2003 and for Norway from 1988 to 2003 without gaps. To keep the panel balanced, I 




The time series properties of the single series cannot be determined in a serious statistical 
way. Any unit root test is inapplicable because of too few observations. However, this does 
not change the properties of the series, of course. In other words, in case of instationarity of 
the series, they will remain instationary, although only 24 periods in time are considered. 
Hence, one would end up with a spurious regression in a model using levels instead of first 
differences. From other and above mentioned empirical research we know that expenditure 
series are mostly identified as I(1) processes. Thus, I will also use first differences in the 
current paper. 
Figure 1  
Social Expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) from 1980 to 2003; average of the 20 
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Source OECD (2007): Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2007) 
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4  The empirical model 
4.1  Model set up 
The basic econometric panel data model looks as follows: 
∆log Social Expendituresit =  β0 + β1 ∆log Gross Domestic Producti,t-1  
+ β2 ∆log Old Age Populationit + β3 ∆log Unemploymentit+ β4 ∆log Tradeit  
+ β5 ∆log Foreign Direct Investmentit+ δj Political Variableijt + ut                                          (1)  
where the dependent variable ∆log Social Expendituresit denotes the first differences of the 
change in social expenditures. I follow the related studies to include as explanatory variables 
for control purposes: The lagged first differences of the change in GDP (∆log Gross Domestic 
Producti,t-1), the change in the number of the population with age 65 and older (∆log Old Age 
Populationit), the change in the unemployment rate (∆log Unemploymentit), the change in the 
trade per capita for goods and services (∆log Tradeit) and the change in the Foreign Direct 
Investment (∆log Foreign Direct Investmentit).5 For this reason, the general economic 
situation, the demographic development and the situation of the labour market are taken into 
account. Note that GDP in period t forms the denominator of the dependent variable. Thus the 
model uses the GDP growth in period t-1 as explanatory variable to avoid endogeneity 
problems. Furthermore, the trade performance (sum of imports and exports) is included to 
control for effects of foreign trade interdependences on social expenditures. For the same 
reason foreign direct investment is included, measured as the sum of the in- and outflow of 
foreign direct investment in the respective year. In contrast to previous studies6, I do not 
include their ratios to GDP but absolute values to avoid endogeneity problems. Moreover, 
data for foreign direct investment are not available for all countries.7 That is why its inclusion 
results in smaller samples. I will report the different specifications. Lastly, several panel data 
approaches are applied to fortify the robustness of the results. 
                                                 
5 The data sources for the explanatory variables are: GDP (OECD Outlook Data Base), Old Age Population 
(Worldbank), Unemployment rate (OECD Outlook Data Base and ECONSTAT), Trade (OECD Outlook Data 
Base), Foreign Direct Investment (UNCTAD). 
6 See e. g. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) 
7 Data are incomplete for Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland. Belgium and Luxembourg are 
totally excluded in these regressions. Discussion Papers  676 
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4.2 Political  variables 
Most important, Political Variableijt describes the political variables, on which this study 
focuses listed in Table 1.  






Size of Coalitionit 
Minority Governmentit 
 
The variables Electionit and Pre-Electionit take the exact timing of the elections into account. 
Following Franzese (2000), they are calculated as 
Electionit = [(M-1) + d/D]/12 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days 
in that month. In pre-election years the variable is calculated as 
Pre-Electionit = [12 - (M-1) - d/D]/12 
In all other years, their values are set to zero. Therefore, I directly control for fluctuations and 
the fact, that the election dates differ between as well as in the single countries. The election 
dates are reported in Appendix A.1. 
The most important challenge for the partisan test in an OECD panel is the heterogeneity of 
the parties and parliamentary systems in the single states. Hence the question comes up what 
kind of government could be labelled left or right – especially when there are more than two 
parties in the government with different ideological roots. Researchers often use the index by 
Budge et al. (1993) and updated by Woldendorp et al. (1998) and (2000) as a measure of the 
governements’ ideological positions. It locates the cabinet on a left-right scale with values 
between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of right-wing parties in terms of seat in 
government and their supporting parties in parliament is larger than 2/3, 2 if it is between 1/3 
and 2/3. The index is 3 in a balanced situation if the share of centre parties is 50 per cent, or if Discussion Papers  676 
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the left- and right-wing parties form a government together not dominated by one or the other 
side. Corresponding to the first two cases it takes the values 4 and 5 by a dominance of the 
left-wing parties likewise defined. Following this procedure, I construct an ideological index 
for the 20 examined countries in the period from 1980 to 2003. Appendix A.2 provides all the 
values of this index. Consequently, I get a uniform quantitative measure. Finally, I label years 
in which the government changed corresponding to the one that was in office for the longer 
period, e. g. when a right government followed a left one in August, I label this year as left.  
At last, the type of government is tested by two variables whereas previous studies used just 
one variable. Roubini and Sachs (1989) constructed an index of power dispersion which 
distinguishes between the number of coalition partners as well as if the government was a 
minority government. Unfortunately, this procedure mixes the quantitative feature of the 
number of parties in the coalition with a qualitative feature, namely if this government has a 
majority in parliament or not. Therefore, I first install a variable controlling for the number of 
parties in government. It ranges from 0 (no coalition) to 2 (huge coalition): 
0 one-party majority parliamentary government; 
1 coalition parliamentary government with two-to-three coalition partners; 
2 coalition parliamentary government with four or more coalition partners; 
Further I use a simple dummy variable to control for the impact of minority governments.8 It 
takes on the value “1” when the government does not have a majority in parliament and zero 
otherwise. Thus, both variables referring to the government type increase with higher decision 
costs of the governments. 
In comparison to other studies testing for the impact of different political variables, I include 
all of them in one regression. Running separate regressions with each political variable would 
contradict the theory that they all have an impact and cause omitted variable bias.  
4.3 Suitable  panel data methods 
Finally, the potential panel data estimation methods suitable in the current framework must be 
discussed. First, taking first differences due to stationarity reasons of the single series 
                                                 
8 The collection of the respective values is a bit challenging. As before, I report all the variables in the appendix to 
make this research as transparent as possible. I compared the data given in Woldendorp et al. (2000), Beck et al. 
(2001) and have contacted single Statistical State Offices as well Government Offices to provide the most 




eliminates time-invariant fixed effects. Hence, the common least squares dummy variable 
estimator (fixed-effects) could be useless. But there could also be time trends in each country, 
so that first differencing just eliminates the time-invariant country effects, but not the 
individual time components. Thus, it might also be sensible to apply fixed-effects on the first 
differences. Random effects could be present, too (see e. g. Greene (2003), Chapter 13 for the 
estimation of panel data models). 
Alternatively, the model could be estimated using a dynamic panel data framework. However, 
in the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator is biased. As Behr 
(2003) states, the estimators taking into account the resulting bias can be grouped broadly into 
the class of instrumental estimators and the class of direct bias corrected estimators. In 
accordance with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e. g. the estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) will be biased in the current framework with N = 20. That is 
why bias corrected estimators might be a good choice. Bruno (2005) presents a bias corrected 
least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N.9 This 
paper wants to test for the impact of the political variables in a robust econometric 
framework. That is why the following section will present results of different estimation 
methods and thereby clarify the sturdiness of the results.  
5 Results 
Table 2 shows the regression results of different estimation procedures and distinguishes 
between the regressions with and without foreign direct investment as explanatory variable.10  
It reports the coefficients and t-ratios for every single equation. By interpreting the 
coefficients, one has to be a bit careful. At first, I take logs of the levels so that the 
coefficients would reflect elasticities. In addition, I take first differences because of 
stationarity reasons. Thus, the estimated coefficients report the relative changes of the growth 
rates of the social expenditures. 
                                                 
9 Xtlsdvc command in STATA. 
10 The F-Tests that the fixed effects are zero could not be rejected. Accordingly, the LM-Test could not reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of the random effects model. Hence I report the results of the model with a common 
constant. Furthermore, I correct for autocorrelation of first order in the residuals using panel error-corrected 
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2  0.2604  0.2313   0.2784  0.2406  
N ×T  460 460 440 390 390 375 
t-statistics in parentheses: */**/***: significant at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level. 
 
Most important, the impacts of the political variables do not change irrespective of the 
econometric specification12 (and hence the sample size and composition). In accordance with 
the political business cycles, I expect politicians to increase social expenditures before 
elections and affecting the preferences of the median voter. Table 2 does not report any 
statistical significant effect of election and pre-election years. Hence the results do not 
confirm any opportunistic behaviour of the politicians. However, interpreting this finding one 
has to consider the different election cycles in the single countries. This means that e. g. in 
                                                 
11 The results refer to the Arellano-Bond estimator as initial one and the standard errors are bootstrapped within 
200 repetitions. 
12 The null hypothesis of the F-test that all the individual (fixed) effects are zero cannot be reject. Consequently, 
also the LM-Tests reports that there are no random effects. Hence I estimate a model with a common constant. 
Interestingly, the political variables do also have no impacts in dynamic panel data specifications using levels 




countries like Australia and New Zealand elections were held every three years. In addition, 
general elections occurred irregularly when parliaments were dissolved due to political 
instabilities. Hence, from a long-run perspective, the smaller the distance between single 
elections dates, the more unlikely are potential effects on social expenditures. 
Furthermore, the ideological party composition of the governments does not significantly 
affect social expenditures in the period from 1980 to 2003. Parties do not matter. This is an 
interesting finding because it does not confirm the theoretical and intuitive prospects that left 
governments expand the social sector. However, it is in line with Potrafkes (2006a) current 
result that parties did not affect expenditures for “Social Protection” from 1990 to 2004. The 
same holds for the impacts of the coalition size and the fact if the governments have a 
majority in parliament. The results do not report any significant impacts. The finding, that 
these political variables do not affect social expenditures, does not at all depend on single 
countries in the sample. As it is common in the literature, I check the sensitivity of the results 
to individual countries. Therefore, I rerun the regression in Table 2 excluding one country at a 
time. None of the results are sensitive to the inclusion of a particular country.  
Instead, the results confirm that social expenditures are driven by structural economic 
indicators. I will discuss the impacts of these variables a bit closer because they seem to 
interact with the political variables in a sensible way. The higher the international trade of a 
single country, the lower are social expenditures. This finding is in line with the theoretical 
prospect of the efficiency effect as well as the current empirical findings. In contrast to 
previous studies (e. g. Kumpmann (2004)) foreign direct investment, the second globalization 
indicator – also has a significant negative impact on social expenditures. However, the 
numerical effect is weaker than the one engendered by international trade. Its direction also 
confirms the prospects that social expenditures decrease, the higher a country is integrated 
and linked with international competition. Thus, these findings imply that the “efficiency 
effect” counterbalances the “compensation effect”. National governments do not seem to 
protect their citizens against the risks of the globalization. But this finding is perfectly in line 




from 1980 to 2003, whereas the economic indicators do (unemployment rates strongly affect 
the rise of the social expenditures).13  
The results become even more intuitive by running regressions within smaller spaces of time. 
Testing the impact of the respective variables in the period from 1980 to 1989 (static 
econometric model), I find that left governments indeed cause higher social expenditures, 
whereas the influence of the globalization is weaker. Also for further sub samples including 
the 90ies, parties matter in the expected manner, but the significance of results changes in 
accordance with the sample size. However, election and pre-election years as well as the type 
of government do not matter at all. In conclusion, these findings indicate that the impact of 
national policy on social expenditures declines in time elapsed while the globalization effects 
become more severe.  
Lastly, social expenditures might emerge as a too general measure to test for political effects. 
In particular, they might ignore political interactions and compensating effects with respect to 
specific fields in social policy. Previous research has shown that policy affects economic 
outcome in various ways and it still extremely sensible that it does because otherwise one 
might doubt the basics of democratic systems. Hence researchers might ask how and why this 
might be the case. In Potrafke (2006), I stress that it is very important to check the real room 
of manoeuvre for political activities when respective tests are installed. This does not 
contradict the meaning of the current study. In contrast, this paper rather contributes to a 
current strength of literature and illustrates that policy effects are absent when single 
instruments are difficult to identify. 
6 Conclusion   
This paper analyses policy effects on social expenditures in OECD countries from 1980 to 
2003. The results strongly illustrate that neither election nor pre-election years, nor does the 
party composition of the governments, nor the coalition size or the fact if the government has 
a majority in parliament have an impact. But this was different in earlier periods: Left 
governments indeed caused higher social expenditures. In time elapsed, the impacts of 
                                                 
13 Moreover, the results imply that the change of the old age population does not help to explain the rise of the 
social expenditures. However, this might be due to the fact that the demographic change just started in the 
considered period from 1980 to 2003. Hence the regression result does not necessarily falsify that the increasing 




national governments vanished and the globalization has become more powerful. Further 
research might examine theoretically how politicians’ room of manoeuvre changes in times of 
the globalization. 
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A.2 Party composition and ideological position of the governments 
In Australia, a right-wing coalition consisting of the Liberal Party (LIB) and the National 
Country Party (CNT) ruled till 1982. Then there was a single party government of the left 
Labor Party (ALP) up to 1995. Afterwards, a right-wing coalition of the LIB and the National 
Party (NP) was in power. Belgium was reigned by huge coalition governments. In 1980 and 
1981, the coalition consisted of right as well as left parities. From 1982 to 1987 there were no 
left-wing parties in government. Then left parties joined again till 1999. Since 2000, the 
governments were formed by left parties exclusively. The left Liberal Party (LIB) ruled in 
Canada till 1984. Then from 1985 to 1993 the Progressive Conservative Party (CON) was in 
power – during the first years with a tremendous majority in parliament. Afterwards the 
Liberals took over again. In Denmark, the social democrats ruled up to 1982. Then there 
were right-wing governments till 1992. Afterwards a coalition consisting of left- and right-
wing parties ruled. From 1997 to 2001 there was a left government. Then the right coalition 
consisting of the Liberal Party and the Conservative People Party came in office up to 2005. 
In Finland, parties of the left and the right were in government till 1990. From 1991 to 1994 
there was a right-wing coalition, whereas till 1995 left and right parties formed the 
government again. There was a right government in France in 1980 (Prime Minister member 
of the UDF). Then the socialists were in power up to 1985, followed by a right coalition in 
1986 and 1987. Afterwards, the socialists leaded a left coalition government up to 1992. Then 
the right RPR (in coalition with the UDF) was in office for four years. From 1997 to 2001 
there was again a left government, followed by a right one in 2002 (in September 2002 the 
RPR and DL joined to the UMP). There were only single party governments in Greece. The 
right (ND) was in power up to 1981, then the left (PASOK) took over up to 1989. There were 
two elections in 1989. As the right could not form a government after the first election in 
June, I label this year as left. Then there was a right government from 1990 to 1993. The left 
took over up to 2003. The Social democrats (SPD) and the liberal FDP ruled in Germany up 
to 1982. Then the conservatives reigned from 1983 to 1998 – also in coalitions with the FDP. 




in office. The Fiana Fail (FF) formed a single party government in Ireland15 in 1980. In 1981, 
there was a coalition consisting of the Fine Gael (FG) and the Labour Party (LP), whereas the 
FF took over in 1982 again. From 1983 to 1986 there was again a FG/LP coalition. Then the 
FF formed a coalition with the Progressive Democrats (PD) till 1992. In 1993 and 1994 a 
FG/LP coalition ruled. In 1995 and 1996 the Democratic Left (DL) joined the former 
coalition. Finally, there has been a right wing FF/PD government since 1997. In Italy, the 
governments consisted of several parties. Most important, Christian democrats (DC) as well 
as socialists (PSI) were in government till 1993 (in 1987 only DC for some months), so that I 
label them all as grand coalitions. In 1994, there was a coalition of only right parties. I label 
Dini’s cabinet in 1995 as centre. Further, the coalitions up to 2000 also consisted of parties 
with different ideological roots – left and right. Finally, from 2001 to 2005 Berlusconi’s 
governments were definitely right. The right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated 
politics in Japan. The LDP formed a single party government up to 1983. From 1984 to 1986 
there was a right-wing coalition together with the Shin-Jiyu-Kurabu Party. Then the LDP 
reigned alone again up to 1993. (Note that the huge coalition of seven parties excluding the 
LDP was in office during the second half of 1993 and the first months of 1994. Hence, in 
accordance with the rules to set up the index, it is not mirrored here). Then a grand coalition 
consisting of the LDP, Shakai-to and Sakigake Party was in office from 1994 to 1996. In 1997 
and 1998 the LDP reigned alone. Since then, the New Komeito and the New Conservative 
Party joined several right-wing coalitions. In Luxembourg  a right-wing coalition of the 
Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) and the Democratic Party (DP) was in power till 1984. 
Then a coalition of the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) and the Socialists (LSAP) ruled 
up to 1998. Then there was again a conservative government of the CSV and the DP till 2003. 
A right-wing coalition consisting of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) reigned in the Netherlands till 1981 and from 
                                                 
15 Ordering the Irish parties on a left right scale is not that straightforward. Therefore I will give some background 
information about the Irish party system following Mair and Weeks (2005) to justify my codings. Mair and Weeks 
(2005), p. 136 state that: “Unlike the European examples, the Irish party system is not structured on an 
unequivocal left-right social cleavage. The two main parties, Fianna Fail (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), tend to 
converge around the centre of the ideological spectrum, often crossing sides between centre left and centre-right, 
or occupying both simultaneously”. Furthermore, the FF seems generally to be best regarded as “secular 
conservative” and the FG as conventional Chrisitan democratic. Most important, distinguishing the single 
coalitions on a left-right scale becomes easier by considering the roots of the respective coalition partners: There 
is a left Labor Party (LP) and a right Progressive Party (PD). Hence the only questionable decision might be to 
label the two years of FF government in 1980 and 1982 as right, but the regression results only change marginally 
due to this coding, of course. For further information about the ideological changes of the parties in time elapsed, 




1983 to 1989. In 1982 a grand coalition consisting of the Christian Democratic Appeal 
(CDA), the Labour Party (PvdA) and the (D66) and afterwards in without the PvdA was in 
power. From 1990 to 1994 a grand coalition consisting of the CDA and the PvdA ruled till 
1993. From 1995 to 2002 the PvdA leaded a left government coalition. A right government 
was in office from 2003 to 2005. The right National Party (NP) formed a single party 
government in New Zealand till 1984. Then the left Labour Party (LAB) ruled from 1985 to 
1990, and the NP took over again. Till 1996 the NP formed a coalition wit the New Zealand 
First Party. There was a left-wing coalition consisting of the LAB and a party called Alliance 
till 2000. Portugal was reigned by a right coalition up to 1982. Then, there was a “center 
block” government in 1983 and 1984, and a right-wing coalition government was in power 
again. From 1988 to 1995 there was a right single party government (PSD). From 1996 to 
2001 the socialists (PS) took over. Afterwards a coalition of the PSD and the Social 
Democratic Center-Popular Party (CDS-PP) ruled. In Spain, a right government (UCD) ruled 
till 1982. Then the socialists were in power up to 1995 and a right government (PP) followed. 
There was a right-wing coalition in Sweden from 1980 to 1982. Then the Social Democratic 
Labor Party (SAP) reigned till 1991. Then, there was a right collation till 1994. Since 1995, 
the SAP was in power again. The political system in Switzerland is a bit different as it 
contains many elements of a direct democracy. However, there is a federal parliament and 
government respectively. Since 1980, it has consisted of left- and right-wing parties. There is 
a two party system in the United Kingdom in which the conservatives ruled from 1980 to 
1997 and then the labour party took the power. In the USA, the Democrats were in power in 
1980, followed by the Republicans up to 1993. Then the Democrats were leading up to 2001, 







































  ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 
Australia  1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium  3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Canada  4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Denmark  4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
Finland  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
France  2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
Germany  4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Greece  2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ireland  2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Italy  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Japan  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Luxembourg  2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands  2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 
New Zealand  2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
Portugal  2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
Spain  2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sweden  2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Switzerland  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UK  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
USA  4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 



































  Table 5 
Index Number of coalition partners 
 
  ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 
Australia  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belgium  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark  0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
France  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Germany  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland  0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy  1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Japan  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
New Zealand  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portugal  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Spain  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
UK  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































Dummy Minority Governments 
 
  ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 
Australia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Japan  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Spain  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Sweden  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(with 1 = government does not have a majority in parliament and 0 otherwise) 